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An "Absence of Meaningful Appellate
Review": Juries and Patent
Obviousness
ABSTRACT
The rise in the number of patent infringement trials heard by
juries has brought criticisms of the jury's expansive role to the forefront
of patent law commentary. Under current Federal Circuit practice, the
jury is permitted to deliver a verdict on patent obviousness. Especially
in light of the 2007 Supreme Court decision KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., the role of the jury in obviousness determinations has
come under particular scrutiny. This Note examines the effect of the
jury's expansive role in obviousness determinations on appellate review
of these verdicts. It begins by examining the two conflicting views of
the jury in patent cases; the traditional view limits the jury to deciding
the factual considerations underlying the test for obviousness, while the
modern view allows the jury to decide the ultimate issue of obviousness.
The Note then analyzes the issues that arise under the two theories of
the jury's appropriate role in obviousness determinations. Finally, this
Note suggests that the Federal Circuit should require either special
verdicts or special interrogatories addressing the underlying facts of
the obviousness inquiry in order to preserve de novo review of the legal
conclusion of obviousness injury trials.
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The appropriate role for the jury has always been a contested
issue.' Adversaries of the jury system question the competence and
bias of juries,2 while proponents argue that the jury adds credibility
and fairness to the legal system. 3 The controversy over the proper role
of juries in patent infringement cases, where both the subject matter
and the law itself are highly technical, is no different. Some patent
law commentators argue that juries are biased in favor of
patentability, possibly due to the deference the jury grants to the
expertise of patent examiners at the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO).4 Commentators further suggest that
juries are not able to understand complex technologies enough to
determine if the patent is valid. 5 The role of juries in obviousness
determinations, one of the three components of patent validity, is
currently a source of contention among patent law scholars. 6 Under
current Federal Circuit practice, the jury is permitted to return a
1. Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts or Fictions, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 386
(1954).
2. Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside the
Black Box, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 209, 214 (2001) [hereinafter Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent
Cases].
3. Amy Tindell, Toward a More Reliable Fact-Finder in Patent Litigation, 13 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 309, 309 (2009).
4. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 2, at 214.
5. Posting of Mike Masnick (Should There Be PHOSITA Juries In Patent Trials?) to
Techdirt, http://techdirt.com/articles/20090414/1826114514.shtml (Apr. 21, 2009, 12:31) ("Juries
are notoriously inclined to side with patent holders, often because they don't know enough about
the technology to know whether or not the patent is valid.").
6. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (noting that patentability requires
utility, novelty, and nonobviousness).
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verdict on the issue of whether the invention in question satisfies the
nonobviousness requirement for patent validity.
7
However, two recent developments in patent law are cause for
a new examination of the role of the jury. First, despite the lack of
faith commentators seem to have in the jury, jury trials for patent
infringement cases have soared in the past ten years.8 From 1968 to
1970, only 2.8 percent of patent trials were tried to juries; from 1997
to 1999, that number jumped to 59 percent.9 Between 2002 and 2004,
the percentage of jury trials rose over 68 percent. 10
Second, the recent Supreme Court decision in KSR
International Co. v. Teleflex Inc. rejected a "rigid approach" to
obviousness determinations.'1 Over 40 years ago, in Graham v. John
Deere Co., the Court held that the obviousness determination is a legal
inquiry largely based on factual considerations, which are appropriate
for the jury to decide. 12 For inventions resulting from a combination of
known technologies, the test set forth in Graham evolved to require a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the existing
technologies in order to find a patent invalid for obviousness.' 3 In
2007, the Court reaffirmed Graham in KSR, but rejected the "rigid
approach" of the teaching-suggestion-motivation test 4 the Federal
Circuit developed in favor of the "broad inquiry" Graham first
established.15 Resolving the appropriate jury role is especially
important in light of the rise of jury trials and the return to a more
flexible approach to the obviousness determination.
The purpose of this Note is to examine the effect of the jury's
expansive role in obviousness determinations when such verdicts face
appellate review. This Note addresses the issue of whether appellate
review of jury verdicts on obviousness needs reform.16 Post-KSR, the
7. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1020-21 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
8. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 2, at 210.
9. Id.
10. Paul M. Janicke & LiLan Ren, Who Wins Patent Infringement Cases? 34 AIPLA Q. J.
1, 14-15 (2006) ("Of those ninety-five [patent infringement] trials per year, about sixty-five are
now jury trials and the remainder bench trials to district judges or magistrate judges.").
11. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
12. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
13. In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
14. See infra Part I.B.2.
15. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 415.
16. The discussion in this Note is limited to the appropriate role of juries in patent
infringement cases with respect to uniformity of law and reviewability by appellate courts. The
Note does not address Seventh Amendment issues that may arise by further restricting the role
of juries in patent cases. For a discussion of Seventh Amendment issues in patent cases, see Amy
Tindell, Toward a More Reliable Fact-Finder in Patent Litigation, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
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Federal Circuit has given little insight into the reasoning behind jury
verdicts of obviousness absent special verdicts or special jury
instructions. Part I examines the law of patent validity and the
development of the test for obviousness. Part II examines the two
conflicting views of the jury in patent cases; the traditional view limits
the jury to deciding the factual considerations underlying the test for
obviousness, while the modern view allows the jury to decide the
ultimate issue of obviousness. Part III analyzes the issues that arise
under the two theories of the jury's appropriate role in obviousness
determinations. Finally, Part IV presents the Note's conclusion that
in light of the Supreme Court's rejection of a "rigid approach" to
obviousness determinations and the limitations of general verdicts,
the Federal Circuit should require either special verdicts or special
interrogatories addressing the underlying facts of the Graham inquiry
in order to preserve de novo review of the legal conclusion of
obviousness in jury trials.
I. DEFINING PATENT OBVIOUSNESS
A. Patent Validity and the Federal Circuit
In 1982, Congress established the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to ensure uniformity of patent law. 17 The Federal
Circuit has exclusive intermediate appellate jurisdiction over cases
arising under patent law.18 A decision of patent invalidity by the
Federal Circuit is binding on all future cases except appeals, whether
in an appeal from a Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
rejection of an inventor's application or in a patent infringement suit
in which the issue of validity was raised as a defense. 19 Because it is
binding, an inventor whose patent was invalidated cannot assert
patent claims against future alleged infringers. 20 A finding of patent
validity, however, is not binding on future alleged infringers, which
allows future alleged infringers to challenge validity. 2' With such
REV. 309 (2009); Meng Ouyang, Note, The Procedural Impact of KSR on Patent Litigation, 6
BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 158 (2009); Barry S. Wilson, Note, Patent Invalidity and the Seventh
Amendment: Is the Jury Out?, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787 (1997).
17. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: About the Court,
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited February 15, 2010).
18. Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit, 28 U.S.C. §
1295(a)(1) (2009); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: About the Court,
www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last visited February 15, 2010).
19. Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
20. See id.
21. Id. at 332-33.
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high stakes, patentees fight hard against defendant's claims of patent
invalidity.
In patent infringement cases, the defendant often raises a
claim of patent invalidity.22 An issued patent carries a presumption of
validity;23 the party challenging validity bears the burden of
overcoming this presumption with clear and convincing evidence.
24
Since the Supreme Court first addressed the nonobviousness
requirement of patent validity, courts have consistently held that
patent validity is a question of law. 25 While patent validity is question
of law, validity turns on factual considerations. 26  Obviousness
determinations are appealable to the Federal Circuit regardless of
which fact-finder made this determination, but the identity of the fact-
finder plays a significant role in how the appeal is conducted.
As in other areas of law, the standard of review for questions of
fact varies depending on the identity of the fact-finder. In jury trials,
the Federal Circuit reviews underlying factual considerations for
"substantial evidence," regardless of whether those factual findings
are explicit in the jury's verdict or are presumed from the jury's
ultimate conclusion on obviousness. 27 This is the same standard of
review other circuits gave to jury determinations prior to the
establishment of the Federal Circuit.28 In cases where the jury verdict
addresses the ultimate conclusion on obviousness, the Federal Circuit
reviews the legal conclusion de novo.
29
The Federal Circuit is more deferential to jury verdicts than to
judicial decisions. 30  The Federal Circuit reviews judicial
determinations of obviousness de novo and reviews judicial fact-
findings for clear error. 31 Because judges are required to articulate
the reasoning behind their decisions, the decision-making process,
22. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1014
(Fed. Cir. 2009).
23. Remedies for Infringement of Patent, and Other Actions, Presumption of Validity;
Defenses, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2009).
24. Bristol-Meyer Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
25. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 155 (1950); Graham
v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. 425 U.S. 273, 280 (1976).
26. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17.
27. Kinetic Concepts Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1021 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
28. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1335 (7th Cir. 1983).
29. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
30. Kimberly A. Moore, Essay, Juries, Patent Cases, & a Lack of Transparency, 39 Hous.
L. REV. 779, 790-91 (2002) [hereinafter Moore, Lack of Transparency].
31. Id.
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rather than just the conclusion, is open to scrutiny by the Federal
Circuit. 32 Jury cases-even those with special verdicts-rarely offer
the same insight into the reasoning underlying the verdict. 33 With no
insight into the reasoning underlying the jury verdict, the Federal




To satisfy patentability requirements, an invention must be
useful, novel, and nonobvious. 35 In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress
codified the "judicial precedents embracing [patentability]." 36  One
such precedent is the 1851 Supreme Court case Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood, which laid the foundation for the requirement that an
invention must be nonobvious, where the Court held that a patent in
which the sole improvement was the substitution of clay or porcelain
for wood or metal doorknobs could "never be the subject of a patent"
because the substitution is "destitute of ingenuity or invention." 37
Codifying the rule in Hotchkiss, Congress enacted, § 103(a) of the
Patent Act states that an invention is obvious if "the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains."38 In the years since the
Patent Act's passage, the Graham factors, 39 the "teaching-suggestion-
motivation" test,40 and the KSR holding have played pivotal roles in
the development of the modern obviousness test. The obviousness test
still requires an analysis of the four Graham factors and any teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine, where none of the factors are
dispositive. 41 The role of each of these three developments in the law
of patent obviousness is explained in turn.
32. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 2, at 249.
33. Id. at 248-49.
34. Id.
35. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
36. Id. at 3.
37. Id. at 3-4. The test the Hotchkiss court developed for obviousness was whether "no
other ingenuity or skill [was] necessary to construct the [invention] than that of an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business." Id. (quoting Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 253-
54 (1850)); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248, 266 (1851).
38. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006).
39. See infra Part I.B.1.
40. See infra Part I.B.2.
41. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417-19 (2007).
JURIES AND PATENT OBVIOUSNESS
1. The Graham Factors
In 1966, the Supreme Court established a test for obviousness
in Graham.42  Under this test, the "ultimate question of patent
validity is one of law," but the obviousness determination "lends itself
to several basic factual inquiries."43 In Graham, the Court outlined
the four factual inquiries that must be considered in determining
obviousness: (1) "the scope and content of the prior art," (2) the
"differences between the prior art and the claims at issue," (3) "the
level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art," and (4) "secondary
considerations [such] as commercial success, long felt but unsolved
needs, [and] failure of others."44 This test, which the Supreme Court
acknowledged was not likely to lead to a consensus in every factual
situation, was designed with the intent that the approach each court
took would be relatively consistent.
45
Regardless of the objective factors developed in Graham,
application of the obviousness doctrine has been exceptionally
difficult. The determination is said to have an "'I know it when I see
it' quality,"46 which is in tension with the Supreme Court's warning to
avoid finding obviousness in hindsight.47  To counter this, the
Supreme Court cautions the fact-finder to be wary of "arguments
reliant upon ex post reasoning" and "the distortion caused by the
hindsight bias."
48
2. Teaching, Suggestion, or Motivation Test
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (the precursor to the
Federal Circuit 49) expanded on the Graham factors with the addition
of the teaching-suggestion-motivation (TSM) test.50  The Federal
42. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of
Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 990 (2008).
47. Graham, 383 U.S. at 36; KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
48. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 421. The term "hindsight bias" refers to obviousness
inquiries that focus on tracking back from the invention at issue to make connections to the prior
art, rather than starting with the prior art and inquiring whether the connection from the prior
art to the invention at issue would have been obvious prior to the invention thereof. See id.
49. Federal Judicial Center, U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (successor to the
Court of Custom Appeals), 1910-1982, http://www. c.gov/history/home.nsf/page/patent-bdy (last
visited October 18, 2009Feb. 15, 2010).
50. In re Bergel, 292 F.2d 955, 956-57 (C.C.P.A. 1961). 'The mere fact that it is possible
to find two isolated disclosures which might be combined in such a way to produce a new
2010]
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Circuit continued to apply the TSM test after the court was granted
jurisdiction over patent appeals. 51 The purpose of the TSM test was to
require "finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within
the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with
no knowledge of [the] invention. 52 The TSM test developed a bright-
line rule that was rigidly applied. To establish obviousness based on a
combination of known elements, the TSM test requires an explicit
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine in the prior art.53
Where obviousness is based on a single reference, there must be an
explicit teaching, suggestion, or motivation to "modify the teachings of
that reference." 54  Without a finding of teaching, suggestion, or
motivation, a patent was nonobvious. 55
The source of the teaching, suggestion, or motivation was not
limited to explicit disclosures in the prior art. 56 According to the
Federal Circuit, sources of this teaching include statements in the
prior art, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the nature
of the problem to be solved. 57 Furthermore, the teaching need not be
explicit, but instead "may be implicit from the prior art as a whole."58
If an implicit teaching satisfies the TSM test, "the combined
teachings, knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, and the nature
of the problem to be solved as a whole" must have suggested the
combination to one of ordinary skill in the art.59 With such a high
threshold requirement, the TSM test made the obviousness
determination much more formalistic.
3. KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
In a unanimous decision in 2007, the Supreme Court rejected
the "rigid approach" of the TSM test, arguing that this test was
inconsistent with the "expansive and flexible approach" developed in
compound does not necessarily render such production obvious unless the art also contains
something to suggest the desirability of the proposed combination." Id.
51. Federal Judicial Center , U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (successor to
the Court of Custom Appeals), 1910-1982, http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/patent-bdy
(last visited Feb. 15, 2010); see also In re Gordon, 733 F.2d 900, 902 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
52. Id. at 1371.
53. In re Kotzab, 217 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 1370.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (emphasis added).
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Graham and Hotchkiss.60 The Court affirmed Graham but rejected
the TSM test of the Federal Circuit.6 1 In doing so, the Court argued
that the obviousness determination cannot be "confined by a
formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation."6 2 The KSR Court recognized the difficulty in applying
the principles set forth in Graham, especially in cases where the
argument supporting obviousness rested on more than a substitution
of one known element for another, which was the case at issue in
KSR.63  After recognizing the complexity of the Graham factor
analysis, which may require weighing data from a variety of sources,
including multiple patents, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o
facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit."
6 4
Furthermore, the Court in KSR outlined additional situations that
would give rise to a finding of obviousness, stating that "design
incentives and other market forces can prompt variations" of current
technology. 6  When these variations are predictable, the invention is
likely unpatentable due to obviousness. 66 Additionally, the use of a
known technique to improve similar devices is often grounds for
invalidation based on obviousness, as long as the technique is within
the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill.67 The Court also found
that "obvious to try" may be sufficient to support an obviousness
finding, at least when there is a problem to solve and a "finite number
of identified, predictable solutions."
68
The Supreme Court also expanded the realm of relevant prior
art on which an obviousness determination can be based. 69 Courts
should not restrict the focus to "only ... the problem the patentee was
60. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007). "The obviousness analysis
cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation." Id. at 419.
61. Id. at 415.
62. Id. at 419.
63. Id. at 417.
64. Id. at 418. "Often, it will be necessary for a court to look to interrelated teachings of
multiple patents; the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the
marketplace; and the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill in the
art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to combine the known
elements in the fashion claimed by the patent at issue." Id.
65. Id. at 417.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 421. "One of the ways in which a patent's subject matter can be proved obvious
is by noting that there existed at the time of invention a known problem for which there was an
obvious solution encompassed by the patent's claims." Id. at 419-20.
69. Id. at 420.
2010]
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trying to solve."70 In support of this premise, the Supreme Court
stated that a person of ordinary skill in the art also possesses
"ordinary creativity."71 The Supreme Court recognized that the
"problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many addressed
by the patent's subject matter," and the appropriate approach
considers whether the improvement over the prior art was obvious to a
person having ordinary skill in the art, "not whether the combination
was obvious to the patentee."72
While the requirement of the TSM test along with the Graham
factors made the obviousness determination much easier to apply, the
Supreme Court found that the application of the rigid test was
inconsistent with principles of patent law. 73 Because the TSM test
required a motivation in published articles and patents, the effect of
the market on design and innovation trends was underestimated. 74
Furthermore, when courts rigidly require evidence of a motivation to
combine, the court fails to consider whether the field of the invention
is one in which there is "little discussion of obvious techniques or
combinations."75
While the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's rigid
application of the TSM test, the Court did not reject all consideration
of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine. 76 Rather, the
Supreme Court rejected the notion that the presence or absence of a
teaching, suggestion, or motivation was determinative in the
obviousness inquiry. 77 The appropriate analysis "need not seek out
precise teachings."78  Instead, the appropriate analysis can consider
"the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the
art would employ."79
Some argue that the KSR holding itself requires a restriction of
the role of the jury to answering special interrogatories on the factual
determinations based on the Supreme Court's discussion of the
considerations necessary to determine obviousness, where the Court
70. Id.
71. Id. at 421.
72. Id. at 420.
73. Id. at 419.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 402.
76. Id. at 419 ('There is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the
TSM test and the Graham analysis.") (emphasis added); Jesse Jenner & Ramy Kasthuri, The
Evolution of Obviousness After KSR, 984 PLI[PAT 469, 471 (2009).
77. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 418.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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explicitly refers to this as the duty of "a court."80  Regardless of
whether this reading of KSR is correct, the holding in KSR, while
shedding light on the obviousness determination, made the test more
difficult to apply. Without the requirement of finding a teaching to
support obviousness, the inquiry returns to a balancing of the Graham
factors, which risks a lack of consensus on the ultimate obviousness
determination.
Other commentators argue that the KSR holding did not have
a substantial impact on the execution of the obviousness inquiry as a
whole.81 However, the re-implementation of the "flexible approach"
first outlined in Graham and the rejection of the "rigid" approach of
the TSM test does increase the complexity of the obviousness
inquiry.8 2 After KSR and the rejection of a requirement of an explicit
teaching, the Federal Circuit has found a motivation to combine in the
''common sense" or "curiosity" of a person having ordinary skill in the
art, "a market demand," and "the nature of the field."
8 3
The KSR holding developed the obviousness test as it stands
today. The obviousness inquiry requires examining the content and
teachings of the prior art, related problems the prior art sought to
address, the knowledge and creativity of a person of ordinary skill in
the art, the demands of the market, and trends in innovation and
design.8 4 Additionally, the court should also consider whether the
patentee's innovation was a "predictable variation" of prior art or
"obvious to try" in light of the prior art.8 5 Because of the complexity of
the analysis and the breadth of sources, this analysis "should be made
explicit."8
6
Considering the complexity of obviousness determinations, the
appropriate role for the jury to play should be clearly outlined and
strictly limited to factual determinations. The current practice under
the Federal Circuit allows a much more expansive role for the jury as
compared to past precedent of both the Federal Circuit and pre-
Federal Circuit appellate courts. Part II analyzes the different roles
juries have had in obviousness inquiries.
80. Ouyang, supra note 16, at 162; KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 418.
81. Jenner & Kasthuri, supra note 76, at 490.
82. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 415.
83. Jenner & Kasthuri, supra note 76, at 472 (internal quotations omitted); see also In re
Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Line Rothman v. Target Corp., 556 F.3d 1310, 1319
(Fed. Cir. 2009); Erico Int'l Corp. v. Vutec Corp., 516 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re
Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
84. KSR Int7 Co., 550 U.S. at 415-419.
85. Id. at 417, 421.
86. Id. at 418.
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Because the Federal Circuit has maintained nearly exclusive
intermediate appellate review of patent cases since 1984, 87 there is
not a traditional circuit split on this issue. Additionally, the Federal
Circuit is not bound by patent law precedent developed in other courts
of appeals prior to its establishment.8 8 However, when the regional
courts of appeal still maintained jurisdiction over patent law cases,
both the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit expressly rejected a
system in which the jury was the ultimate decision maker on the issue
of obviousness. 8 9 Under current practice, the jury is permitted to
submit a general verdict on the issue of obviousness. 90
A. The Restricted Role of the Jury in Pre-Federal Circuit Courts
1. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals:
Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co.
In an en banc rehearing, the Seventh Circuit addressed the
issue of the role of the jury in obviousness determinations. 91 Relying
on the obviousness test set forth in Graham, the Roberts court
determined that the Supreme Court had already outlined the
respective roles of the judge and jury.92 According to the court's
analysis, the jury resolves "disputes as to the Graham subsidiary
facts," while the trial judge makes the ultimate decision on
obviousness by determining "whether the facts as found by the jury
fall within the legislative standard."93
One of the issues on appeal in Roberts was the form of the five
special verdict forms given to the jury, which were to be answered
"yes" or "no.' '94 The jury answered all the verdicts in favor of the
plaintiff, and the defendant appealed on the theory that the "district
87. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Circuit does not have jurisdiction over
a case in which the complaint does not allege a patent claim, but the answer alleges a patent-law
counterclaim. Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., 535 U.S. 826, 827, 834 (2002).
88. See Jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2009).
89. See infra Part N.A.
90. See infra Part II.B.
91. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1329 (7th Cir. 1983).
92. Id. at 1335 ("Graham, in setting forth the analytical steps to be taken in determining
obviousness, necessarily clarified the respective functions of judge and jury.").
93. Id. (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 1328. The fifth special verdict, the only one addressing the issue of
obviousness, read: "We, the jury, find that the subject matter of the Roberts patent considered as
a whole was not obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art in the years 1963-64." Id.
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court erred in submitting to the jury the 'legal questions' of
obviousness and anticipation."95  The foundation of the appellant's
theory was that submitting these issues to the jury requires the jury
to interpret the claims of the patent, and claim interpretation is an
established role for the court, not the jury, to fulfill.96 The obviousness
inquiry requires a comparison of the patent at issue to the prior art,
and the appellants argued that this inquiry requires interpretation of
the patent at issue.97 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the appellants,
holding that the district court erred when it made the jury the "final
arbiter of patent validity."98  The role of the jury in claim
interpretation is limited to "a factual dispute as to the meaning of a
term of art," as resolution of this dispute would require expert
testimony and extrinsic evidence. 99 The court said that requiring the
jury to interpret the scope of the patent at issue was inappropriate,
and requiring the jury to interpret the patent at issue "shadowed the
entire decisional process." 100
The Roberts court considered and approved of two alternatives
outlined in a previous Seventh Circuit en banc case, Dual
Manufacturing & Engineering, Inc. v. Burris Industries, Inc.101 The
first method proposed the use of special verdicts under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 49(a). Under the special verdict approach favored by
the Dual court, the verdicts should break down the obviousness
determination to only the "subsidiary questions of fact" on which the
determination is based.102 The second method uses special
interrogatories in conjunction with a general verdict, which would
"test the jury's application of the law in reaching the general
verdict."10 3 The Roberts court contended that the use of a general
verdict without special interrogatories "give[s] rise to the presumption
that the factual issues have been resolved in favor of the prevailing
party," but because the trial court must decide the issue of
obviousness, these general verdicts would be of little use.104 On the
other hand, special verdicts or special interrogatories provide the trial
court with the jury's fact-findings.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1331.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1338.
99. Id. at 1338-39.
100. Id.
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The Roberts court also considered and agreed with the court's
approach in Panther Pumps & Equipment Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc.,
another Seventh Circuit case in which the jury submitted a general
verdict after the judge issued compulsory instructions. 10 5  The
instructions stated that if the jury found the facts to be one way, it
must issue a verdict of obviousness, but if the jury found the facts to
be another way, it must issue a verdict of nonobviousness. 10 6 The
Panther Pumps court thus posited that the trial court could retain
ultimate control over the legal issue through the jury instructions;10 7
while the Roberts court found that even though the jury issues the
general verdict without special interrogatories, the trial judge retains
ultimate control over the legal decision. 08
Under the procedural methods explored in the Roberts opinion,
the courts could presume that the facts were found supporting the
verdict. Without some procedural protections ensuring facts
supporting the jury's verdict, the court cannot make this
presumption. 0 9 It is for this reason that the Roberts court rejected the
trial court's general verdict unsupported by either compulsory jury
instructions or interrogatories."10
The court emphasized that obviousness is necessarily fact-
dependent, and reliance on the facts of the case helps prevent
inquiries distorted by hindsight or by the simplicity of the
invention."' However, determination of patent validity, including
obviousness, is the responsibility of the trial courts. The Roberts court
found that this is best accomplished with special verdicts or special
interrogatories,112 but that compulsory jury instructions, like those
used in Panther Pumps, also preserve appellate review of obviousness
determinations.113
105. Id. at 1340-43.
106. Id. at 1341.
107. Id. at 1331; Panther Pumps & Equipment Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 228
(7th Cir. 1972).
108. Roberts, 723 F.2d at 1342.
109. See supra, notes 106-108 and accompanying text.
110. Roberts, 723 F.2d at 1342-43.
111. Id. at 1334. The Court also noted that "the labeling of obviousness as a question of
law and the requirement of a specific factual foundation for its determination serve as checks on
an otherwise highly subjective determination." Id. at 1335 n.12.
112. Id. at 1340.
113. Id. at 1342.
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2. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals: Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also held an en banc
hearing on the issue of the jury's role in obviousness
determinations. 114 The Ninth Circuit held that the court must retain
control over the ultimate issue of obviousness, but that in a jury trial,
the trial court must submit the underlying factual issues set forth in
Graham to the jury. 115 The Sarkisian court urged the use of special
interrogatories in submitting these factual determinations to the jury,
after which the court must then make the obviousness determination
based on the jury's factual determinations. 1 6 Under this scheme, the
trial court may also submit the obviousness question to the jury for
guidance, as long as the court satisfies its obligation to decide the
issue independent of the jury."
7
The Sarkasian court rejected the idea that the trial court may
submit the ultimate obviousness determination to the jury, as long as
it is accompanied by proper instructions in the law, finding this
approach incompatible with its holding that the court "must decide
obviousness specifically as a matter of law."" 8 Therefore, under the
Sarkasian rule, the trial court may submit the ultimate issue of
obviousness to the jury only for guidance, and special interrogatories
are the preferred method for submitting factual determinations to the
jury.
Under the en banc hearings of both the Seventh and the Ninth
Circuit, these appellate courts held that the jury should decide the
underlying issues of fact, but that the ultimate determination of
obviousness should be conducted by the trial court." 9 The Roberts
court advocated the use of special verdicts or special interrogatories.'
20
The Roberts court also indicated that specific instructions may support
a general verdict on obviousness, namely, that if the jury finds the
evidence to be X, the verdict must correspondingly be Y.121 The
Sarkasian court also advocated the use of special interrogatories, but
rejected the notion that verdicts on the ultimate issue could be
anything more than advisory, even if accompanied by proper




118. Id. at 651 (emphasis added).
119. Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 723 F.2d 1324, 1342 (7th Cir. 1983); Sarkasian, 688
F.2d at 649.
120. See supra notes 111-1123 and accompanying text.
121. Roberts, 723 F.2d at 1342.
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instructions on the law of obviousness. 122 Both circuits advocated for
the court to make the ultimate obviousness determination, but neither
required a specific procedure. 123
B. The Federal Circuit prefers, but does not require, special
interrogatories with general verdicts.
Under the Federal Circuit, trial courts have been permitted to
submit the question of obviousness to juries without requiring special
verdicts or special interrogatories under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 49.124 However, the Federal Circuit prefers that special
interrogatories accompany general verdicts in order to facilitate
appellate review 125 and does not consider a district court's submission
of this issue by general verdict an abuse of discretion. 126 When a jury
submits only a general verdict on the issue of obviousness, "the law
presumes the existence of fact findings implied from the jury's having
reached that verdict."'127 This means that, on appeal, the appellate
court presumes that the jury made fact-findings consistent with their
verdict. The Federal Circuit reviews these presumed fact-findings for
"substantial evidence.' 28
In a review of a jury's finding of nonobviousness, the Federal
Circuit stated that where the question of obviousness is addressed in
general verdicts, the jury's verdict addresses the "ultimate legal issue
of obviousness" and provides "no insight as to the jury's findings with
respect to the underlying factual underpinnings."' 129 While recognizing
this shortcoming in general verdicts, the Federal Circuit has declined
to require special verdicts or special interrogatories, claiming that it is
not within its power to do so. 13 0
122. See Sarkisian, 688 F.2d at 650 ('These factual determinations are made by the fact
finder, preferably by detailed special interrogatories in jury trials . . . On the basis of these
findings, the court must determine obviousness as a matter of law.").
123. Id.; Roberts, 723 F.2d at 1340, 1342.
124. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Perkin-
Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Circ. 1984).
125. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 893.
126. Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1514 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
127. Id. at 1516.
128. Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
129. McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1350; see also Agrizap, 520 F.3d at 1356.
130. Agrizap, 520 F.3d at 1356.
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1. The Role for the Jury in Obviousness Determinations
The Federal Circuit has indicated which elements of the
obviousness inquiry are factual and which elements are legal. The
Federal Circuit case law has found that each of the Graham factors
are to be decided by the jury. 13 1 Whether a reference qualifies as prior
art is a question for the jury.132 Consistent with the Supreme Court
decision Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,133  claim
construction, a question of law, is the responsibility of the court. 34
The scope and content of the prior art is a factual determination to be
made by jury. 135 When the parties rely heavily on one of the Graham
factors in disputing the issue of obviousness, a general verdict on
obviousness is appropriate. 136 The level of ordinary skill in the art is
also a factual inquiry.' 37  Even the weight accorded to objective
evidence of nonobviousness is a factual issue. 138  The teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine is an issue of fact to be
determined by the fact-finder. 139 Nevertheless, the Federal Circuit
has stated that whether a reference or combination of references
renders a patent obvious is a "question of law subject to full and
independent review in this court."' 40
In Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., reviewing a
trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit
addressed the appropriate role for the jury in determining whether a
piece of art qualifies as prior art, stating that"[w]hether a reference
was published prior to the critical date, and is therefore prior art, is a
question of law based on underlying fact questions."1 41 The court also
indicated that the jury should decide whether a reference qualifies as
prior art: "while the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding
that the Marquardt document is prior art, a reasonable jury could
ultimately conclude otherwise."'142 But this may only be in regards to
the credibility of the moving party's witnesses, which is one of the
131. See infra notes 132-47 and accompanying text.
132. Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1159 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
133. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
134. Yoon Ja Kim v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 465 F.3d 1312, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
135. Id. at 1326; McGinley, 262 F.3d at 1350.
136. See Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, 554 F.3d 1020, cert. denied sub
nom Medela AG and Medela, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2009).
137. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
138. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d, 1573, 1580-81 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
139. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
140. In re GPAC, 57 F.3d at 1577.
141. Typeright Keyboard Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 374 F.3d 1151, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
142. Id. at 1159.
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grounds the nonmoving party relied upon in appealing the summary
judgment.143 Determinations of whether a reference is prior art often
comes down to disputed facts argued by the parties' respective
witnesses, such as publication dates and whether the reference would
have been within the knowledge of a person with ordinary skill in the
art. 144
The first Graham factor, the scope and content of the prior art,
also requires a determination of what the prior art discloses. The
Federal Circuit has established that this is also a question for the
jury.145 Claim construction, an exercise the court is required to make
in infringement cases, controls both the infringement question as well
as any patent validity issues.146  The second Graham factor,
"differences between the prior art and the claims at issue" requires
claim construction, but the claim construction performed at any
Markman hearings will apply.
147
The Federal Circuit has also rejected the argument that the
court must make an independent obviousness analysis, especially
where the issue ultimately turns on a specific Graham factor. 148 In an
appeal from a denial of a new trial on the obviousness issue, the
Federal Circuit denied a request to overturn the jury's verdict of
nonobviousness. 149 At the district court, the issue of obviousness was
submitted to the jury, and the trial court reviewed the jury's verdict
for substantial evidence when determining whether to grant
defendant's petition for judgment as a matter of law.150 At trial, the
parties disputed over the scope and content of the prior art, and both
parties presented expert testimony supporting their own
143. "If the jury finds the testimony of Microsofts [sic] witnesses credible, and sufficient
to establish that the Marquardt document was published prior to the critical date, the district
court will still have to address whether the legal requirement of corroboration has been met." Id.
(emphasis added). "Corroboration is required of any witness whose testimony alone is asserted to
invalidate a patent." Texas Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1217 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
144. Id.
145. Yoon Ja Kim v. ConAgra Foods, 465 F.3d 1312, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2006); McGinley v.
Franklin Sports, 262 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ('"Wrhat a prior art reference discloses in an
anticipation analysis is a factual determination.").
146. Id. at 1324.
147. Id.
148. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Blue Sky Med. Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1017 (Fed. Cir.
2009) cert. denied sub nom. Medela AG and Medela, Inc. v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 624
(2009). The defendants argued that "the district court strayed by 'treat[ing] the obviousness
conclusion as a pure factual question' and simply reviewing the jury's verdict for substantial
evidence." Id. at 1020 (quoting Appellant's Brief at 54).
149. Id. at 1014.The Federal Circuit also rejected the appellant's alternative request for a
new trial on obviousness. Id. at 1021.
150. Id. at 1017.
JURIES AND PATENT OBVIOUSNESS
interpretations of the prior art. 151 The Federal Circuit held that it is
the province of the jury to make credibility determinations and that
the jury could have found the appellee's experts more credible.' 52 The
court further found that the appellee's testimony was sufficient to
support the jury's verdict.' 53  The court reasoned that since the
defendant's obviousness argument "relied heavily" on the scope and
content of the prior art references, a Graham factual inquiry, the court
"must assume that the jury found that the [scope and content] of the
prior art" was consistent with the jury's verdict of nonobviousness.
154
Although the element of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation
to combine is no longer dispositive after KSR v. Teleflex, 155 it may still
play a role in the obviousness inquiry. The teaching, suggestion, or
motivation to combine is an issue of fact to be determined by the fact-
finder.156
While the obviousness determination is a legal one, 157 the
Federal Circuit allows the court to submit this issue to the jury and
rejects the notion that these verdicts are merely advisory. 158  In
Perkins-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., the Federal Circuit
rejected the use of advisory juries as suggested in Sarkisian.159 The
court reasoned that too much appellate review of general verdicts
raises the risk that the appellate court will substitute its own factual
determinations for those of the jury.1 60 Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, advisory juries may only be used for "actions not
triable of right by a jury."161 When juries are used only in an advisory
capacity, the court is required to enter its own set of findings and
conclusions, just as it would for a bench trial. 62 Furthermore, the
Federal Circuit noted that the non-use of advisory juries stems from a
151. Id. at 1019-20.
152. Id. at 1020.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1021. The Federal Circuit relied on a Fifth Circuit appeal of a motion for
JMOL, which stated that "the evidence, as well as all reasonable inferences form it, are viewed
in the light most favorable to the verdict." Id. (quoting Arsement v. Spinnaker Exploration Co.,
400 F.3d 238, 249 (5th Cir.2005)).
155. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
156. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
157. Graham v. John Deere Inc., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
158. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Perkin-
Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 893 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
159. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 895 n. 5.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. FED R. Cwv. P. 39(c), 52(a); Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 895 n. 5.
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reluctance to require jurors to take time out of their lives to act as
"mere advisors."163
2. Appellate Review of the Issue of Obviousness
In Jurgens v. McKasy, where the appellants failed to preserve
the right to challenge the presumed jury findings as unsupported by
substantial evidence, the Federal Circuit outlined the two-part
standard of review for obviousness determinations submitted to the
jury.164 For factual findings, the court presumes the disputed facts
were resolved in support of the verdict winner; these findings will
remain as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. 165 For
the legal conclusion based on those presumed factual findings, the
court reviews de novo; the inquiry is whether the verdict "is correct in
light of the presumed jury fact findings."166  The Jurgens court,
because of the procedural posture of the case, only performed the
second prong of the analysis, asking whether the facts as told by the
verdict winner supported the legal conclusion the jury reached. 167 The
de novo review the court engaged in consisted solely of a summary of
the verdict winner's evidence.168
When the disputed facts are narrow enough to provide insight
into the jury's support for its verdict, the Federal Circuit is able to
identify a specific misapplication of the law. In the 2008 case Agrizap,
Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., the Federal Circuit overturned a jury's
verdict of nonobviousness. 169  The Federal Circuit's holding of
obviousness was based on the combination of a product already on the
market and two patents. 170 The only disputed facts in this case
163. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 732 F.2d at 895.
164. Jurgens v. McKasy, 927 F.2d 1552, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The appellant failed to
bring a timely motion for a directed verdict, and the court held"[w]here a directed verdict motion
is not made at the close of the evidence, the sufficiency of the evidence underlying presumed jury




167. Id. at 1560.
168. Id.
And if we assume, as we must in this appeal, that the Mattson patent does not
disclose a windsock, but merely a stationary bird-decoy, then that decoy would be no
different than the stationary decoys considered twice by the PTO in determining
obviousness. On the record before us, it would not have rendered obvious the Shieflo
claim.
Id.
169. Agrizap Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
170. Id. at 1344.
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related to objective elements of nonobviousness: commercial success,
copying by others, and a long felt need in the market are secondary
considerations in determining obviousness. The parties did not
dispute the underlying facts of the defendant's prima facie case.
171
Even with the "black box" jury verdict, 172 the court was able to
determine that the only factual issues the jury was left to resolve,
which pertained to the objective elements of nonobviousness, could
not, even if taken for true, overcome the defendant's prima facie
case. 173 As a result, the court was able to determine that the jury gave
too much weight to the objective evidence.
Also, if an undisputed Graham factor is not supported by
substantial evidence, this may provide the Federal Circuit with
enough insight into the jury verdict to reverse it. The Federal Circuit
stated that when it finds that, "even in light of a jury's findings of fact,
the references demonstrate an invention to have been obvious, we may
reverse its obviousness determination."'174 In an appeal from the
district court's denial of both a new trial and judgment as a matter of
law, the Federal Circuit overruled the jury verdict of nonobviousness,
finding a lack of support for a finding that ordinary skill would not
have found a motivation to combine two embodiments located in the
same prior art.175 However, the level of ordinary skill was undisputed,
and therefore, was not submitted to the jury. 176 The Federal Circuit
also agreed that secondary considerations of nonobviousness do not
overcome the prima facie case of obviousness established by the
defendants. 177
When the procedural posture of the case does not provide
insight into any possible errors made by the jury, the Federal Circuit
looks at the evidence as a whole to see if it supports the verdict.178 In
a review of such a case, the court stated that:
Due to the "black box" nature of the jury's verdict, it is impossible to determine which of
the above pieces of evidence, alone or in combination, carried the day in the jury room,
and how much weight was assigned to each piece. All that can be said with certainty is
171. Id. The parties agreed that the only difference between the prior art, and the
patented invention was the substitution of a resistive electric switch for a mechanical pressure
switch. Id. Also, the parties did not dispute that additional pieces of prior art indicated that the
substation of the switches was known in the art prior at the time of invention. Id.
172. Id. at 1343.
173. Id. at 1344.
174. Boston Sci. Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 990 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
175. Id. at 990-91.
176. Id. at 992.
177. Id. at 991.
178. See McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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that-as a whole-the evidence enumerated above (all of which was admittedly before
the jury) constitutes substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict.
17 9
The appellate court overturned the district court's grant of judgment
as a matter of law and reinstated the jury's verdict of
nonobviousness. °80  The Federal Circuit recognized the difficulty
judges face in deciding whether to grant judgment as a matter of law
to overturn a jury's general verdict of obviousness: "it is difficult to
sort out the weight to be given factual determinations in an
obviousness inquiry from the degree to which the district court should
override permissible found-facts to sum-up the legal conclusion of
obviousness vel non."18' But this pre-KSR court relied on the
dispositive element of a motion to combine in refusing to overturn the
verdict.18 2 The court noted that "so long as the parties are content to
give the jury unfettered room to operate on dispositive factual issues
within the scope of a general verdict request" it will respect the
verdict.18 3
III. REQUIRING SPECIAL VERDICTS AND INTERROGATORIES
A. Black box jury verdicts result in an absence of meaningful
appellate review.
General verdicts offer no insight into the obviousness analysis
and result in an absence of meaningful appellate review. The
rejection of the TSM test in KSR has made the inquiry more flexible,
as no Graham factor is dispositive in every situation. Appellate
review under current Federal Circuit practice is a backwards analysis
of the verdict, ending with a determination of the facts the jury could
have relied upon. When general verdicts are used, explicit analysis of
the Graham factors, as recommended in KSR, cannot be accomplished
either at the trial court level or on appeal when general verdicts are
used.
In 1984, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that, by declaring
patent validity a question of law, the Graham court intended for the
trial court's decision to be "fully reviewable on appeal."18 4 The court
stated that "[t]he introduction of the jury can not [sic] change the





184. Structural Rubber Products Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 718 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
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nature of the obviousness decision."185 The appellate court must "be
satisfied that the law has been correctly applied to the facts regardless
of whether the facts were determined by judge or jury."186 Without a
record of how the law was applied to the facts, the appellate court can
never be sure whether the application was correct.
The problem of black box jury verdicts is more in need of
correction since the rejection of the TSM test in KSR. Without the
threshold requirement of a teaching to combine found within the prior
art, the obviousness inquiry has become a multi-factored test with no
single factor being determinative. The Supreme Court, in rejecting
this test, still recognized that the test brought more uniformity to the
obviousness inquiry.187 It follows then, that removing this
requirement increases the risk of non-uniform application. As a
preventative matter, the Federal Circuit needs more insight into how
the rule is being applied by juries. Special verdicts or special
interrogatories would prove this much needed insight.
The result of the Federal Circuit's presumption of facts
underlying the jury's verdict is a backwards approach to de novo
review of the legal question of obviousness. The court is starting with
the verdict and working backwards by finding which facts the jury
presumptively relied upon in making the obviousness determination.
From there, the court looks for substantial evidence to support finding
those facts in favor of the party who won on the obviousness issue.
This perverts the de novo review the appellate court should engage in
when reviewing decisions of law.
The Federal Circuit struggles to give the jury's fact-findings
the deferential substantial evidence standard and still review the
legal conclusion de novo. l88 With black box verdicts, applying a two
level deferential standard is impossible and ends up sacrificing a
meaningful review of the verdict, as the courts presume the jury found
the facts to support its jury verdict. Of course, if the courts adopt a de
novo review of general verdicts on obviousness, then the role of the
jury is a toothless one. In some cases, the Federal Circuit has tried to
separate the substantial evidence review of presumed factual findings
from the de novo review of the legal conclusion.
8 9
Adding to the difficulty, the Federal Circuit presumes that the
jury sided with the verdict winner on every one of the factual disputes.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 719 (emphasis added).
187. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
188. E.g., McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc.; 262 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
189. See id.
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While this may be true in some cases, each of the Graham factors
could easily be found in favor of the two separate parties. For
example, the jury could submit a verdict of nonobviousness, even
though it agreed with the defendant on the scope and content of the
prior art, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue,
but sided with the plaintiff on the higher standard of review. The
Federal Circuit should have the means to review each of the Graham
factors for substantial evidence independent of each other. The
current system does not ensure this.
The black box jury verdicts and the absence of meaningful
review of these verdicts by appellate courts have left the jurisprudence
of obviousness unclear and stunted. Without explicit analysis of the
Graham factors (which the Supreme Court has recommended190), the
law is inconsistently applied and the development of the doctrine of
obviousness is halted. Regardless of whether the jury remains central
in the obviousness determination, it is absolutely necessary that an
explicit legal analysis be provided. This could even be performed at
the appellate level. However, the problem of determining whether the
presumed fact-findings on which the appellate court would rely in
performing the legal analysis were actually the findings on which the
jury relied still remains. This presents the risk that the jury
misunderstands and misapplies the law and the court incorrectly
presumes the jury's fact-findings were those offered by the verdict
winner. In such a situation, the court would be relying on the wrong
facts in performing the obviousness analysis.
In patent law, it is important that the law develop uniformly.
This is the reason the Federal Circuit was established: to do away
with inconsistent development and application of patent law.19' For
the law of obviousness, the need for uniform application of law is just
as important. When the district courts allow juries to render verdicts
on the ultimate issue of obviousness, the development of the
obviousness law is stunted. Furthermore, there is no way to tell
whether the juries are consistently applying the law, especially in the
absence of special verdicts or special interrogatories.
The determination of the credibility of witnesses is well within
the province of the jury, especially on issues such as the scope and
content of the prior art, which the courts have established are factual
determinations.192 This is one of the most important responsibilities
of the jury, and it must remain so. But the system also needs to
190. KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 418.
191. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
192. See supra Part II.B.1.
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provide a meaningful review of those credibility determinations, and
this is where the general verdict system fails.
B. Requiring special verdicts or interrogatories places additional
burdens on an already-complex system.
While requiring special verdicts or interrogatories may be more
time consuming and increase the burden on the jury, these burdens
are necessary to ensure the obviousness inquiry is performed correctly
at the trial court or corrected on appeal. This approach would also
require resolution of what the proper burden of proof for these factual
inquiries should be.
The extensive nature of the factual questions is likely a reason
why this approach has rarely been put to practice. In Structural
Rubber Prods v. Park Rubber, the jury was asked to issue ten special
verdicts solely on the issue of secondary considerations, one of the four
Graham factors. 193 If the courts were to use special verdicts for each
Graham factor, the jury could easily be forced to answer hundreds of
special verdicts. Furthermore, these "yes" or "no" special verdicts are
often inadequate to convey the jury's findings, which are often more a
matter of degree than an absolute answer.194 Some commentators fear
that the extensive use of special interrogatories themselves could
confuse the jury.195 Despite the added burdens and the evident
shortcomings in requiring special verdicts or special interrogatories,
this approach nevertheless improves upon the current system by
granting the appellate court more insight into the obviousness
analysis. Patent infringement suits are already expensive and time-
consuming without this additional requirement. 196 Requiring the jury
to engage in a more cumbersome verdict process will exacerbate the
problem. But when the typical patent infringement case already costs
more than one million dollars to litigate, 197 it seems that a little
additional time spent on jury instructions and deliberations are worth
the trouble, if only to preserve the record for appellate review. Still,
the Seventh Circuit argues that construction of the special verdict
193. Moore, Lack of Transperancy, supra note 30, at 789-90.
194. Brief for Apple, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Medela AG v.
Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 10 S. Ct. 624 (2009) (No. 09-198).
195. Panther Pumps & Equip. Co. v. Hydrocraft, Inc., 468 F.2d 225, 228 n.7 (7th Cir.
1972).
196. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 2, at 211.
197. Id.
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form would be cumbersome for the court. 198 This concern is addressed
by the fact that, if this approach were made a requirement, parties
would be aware of the additional difficulty it entails. Additionally, the
burden that it places on the trial court in developing these jury
instructions is not a strong enough factor to disregard this approach.
The approach, as it stands now, risks completely relieving the trial
court from its duty regarding obviousness. Trial courts merely issue
the jury's verdict or, in the case of a request for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, review it under the highly deferential "no
reasonable jury" standard. 199 There would be no additional burden on
the jury. Even under the special verdict approach, juries should still
be deciding the facts of the case. The special verdicts would simply
make explicit the findings of the jury and show that the jury was
weighing the evidence individually, rather than as a whole.
Chief Judge Paul R. Michel of the Federal Circuit recently
organized a committee to develop model patent jury instructions.
20 0
While the committee ultimately issued some jury instructions, it
recognized a difficulty in determining what the proper burden of proof
on the underlying factual considerations should be.20 1 Traditionally,
the defendant bears the burden of proof of patent invalidity, and the
burden is "highly probative." 20 2 What the committee found difficult
was whether the highly probative standard applied individually to the
Graham factors.
The challenge comes in designing a proper division of work
between the court and jury, that is, separating the ultimate legal
determination from its underlying questions of fact. If the court
reserves the ultimate determination of obviousness for the judge,
letting the jury respond only to the Graham factors, this raises
practical difficulties, since the Graham factors are not easily framed
as yes or no questions. 20 3 As a result, even if the jury must respond to
questions addressing the underlying factual considerations, the issue
198. Meng Ouyang, Note, The Procedural Impact of KSR on Patent Litigation, 6 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 158, 163 (2009); Constantine L. Trela, Jr., An Afterword To: A Panel
Discussion on Obviousness in Patent Litigation: KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, 6 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 633 (2007).
199. FED R. CIv. P. 50(b).
200. MODEL PATENT JURY INSTRUCTIONS, THE NATIONAL JURY INSTRUCTION PROJECT 51
(2009), http://www.nationaljuryinstructions.orgtdocuments/NationalPatentJuryInstructions.pdf;
Heather N. Mewes, Are Juries Ready to Decide Underlying Questions of Fact? Obviously Not,
FENWICK.COM, Nov. 16, 2009, at 2, available at http://www.fenwick.com/docstorefPublications/
Litigation/AreJuriesReady to..Decide.pdf.
201. Id. at 1.
202. Mewes, supra note 200, at 1.
203. Id.
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of how strong the evidence is on one factor, or how much weight the
one factor should carry, still remains.
20 4
While the Graham factors are not necessarily a balancing test,
it is possible to find that some factors weigh in favor of an obvious
finding, while other factors support nonobviousness. Because the
strength of any these factors may be determinative, the appellate
court needs some insight into the jury's findings on the individual
factors, instead of the evidence as a whole, which is the most that a
general verdict unaccompanied by special interrogatories provides.
Furthermore, with this additional information, the substantial
evidence standard can be more particularly applied to the specific
findings, rather than the evidence as a whole. In the event that there
is not substantial evidence to support the jury's finding regarding, for
example, ordinary skill in the art, the change of this single factor may
be determinative on the outcome of the obviousness inquiry. The
Federal Circuit needs a chance to catch errors in the law as well as
errors in fact in order to engage in de novo review of the legal
determination of obviousness while still giving due deference to fact-
findings.
Even insight into how the jury came out on the first three
Graham factors in the form of special verdicts will offer more insight
into the jury's fact-findings than the general verdict often used today.
For the first factor, the scope and content of the prior art, the special
verdicts could consist of a list of prior art offered by the parties, and
where the jury is to answer yes or no as to whether the proffered art
constitutes prior art.
With the combination of a legally complex test for obviousness
with technically complex subject matter, the risk of the jury
misapplying the law is high. Modifying the current appellate review
to make review more meaningful can decrease the negative effects of
such a risk. Furthermore, special verdicts give the trial judge the
opportunity to explicitly lay out the legal analysis resting on the jury's
fact-findings. This would not only give notice to both the parties and
others as to the underlying reasons for the court's ruling on
obviousness, but it would also make the work at the appellate level
more useful, as the Federal Circuit would not have to waste time
speculating as to the facts on which the jury may have relied, and the
analysis would proceed forwards, from facts to legal analysis to
conclusion, rather than backwards.
204. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Note focused on the expansive role the jury fills in
determinations of patent obviousness and the implications of its role
on appellate review of obviousness verdicts. Courts have developed a
multi-factored test to determine whether an invention satisfies the
requirements of non-obviousness determinations. Since the 2007
Supreme Court decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
application of the test for obviousness to the facts of a particular case
has become much harder to apply. In light of the increase in
complexity of obviousness determinations, the role of the jury in these
decisions needs to be reexamined.
Current practice allows the jury to submit general verdicts on
the issue of obviousness, a legal determination. The proper role for the
jury in obviousness determinations is finding the facts that comprise
the Graham factors. To best fulfill this role, the jury should respond
to special verdicts directed at these factual issues. Alternatively, the
jury could submit a general verdict on the issue of obviousness,
accompanied with special interrogatories.
Special verdicts would allow the judge to engage in the legal
analysis while still preserving a meaningful role for the jury. This
would be consistent with the Supreme Court's recommendation that
the analysis be explicit.20 5 On appeal, the Federal Circuit would no
longer have to engage in a backwards analysis of the determination.
The court would be able to develop the obviousness doctrine with clear
analysis of the legal issues. This would improve the predictability and
uniformity of the obviousness doctrine. Although requiring special
verdicts or special interrogatories will place additional burdens on
both the parties and the court, these burdens do not outweigh the
importance of preserving the record to ensure meaningful appellate
review of obviousness determinations.
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